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Norman Fairclough & Isabela Fairclough 
A procedural approach to ethical critique in CDA1 
 
Abstract 
We argue for a procedural approach to ethical critique in CDA based upon the ‘argumentative 
turn’ in CDA advocated in our recent publications.  This is not a matter of abandoning 
substantive critique, or abandoning the long-standing commitment of our version of CDA to 
critique of domination and of ideology, but of integrating them into a deliberative procedure 
for critical questioning, from an impartial and unbiased standpoint.  The advantage of this 
position is that it enables us to accentuate ethical criticism and critique in CDA, rather than 
advocacy and partisanship. The task of critical discourse analysts is to subject argumentation, 
including their own argumentation, to systematic critical questioning in the spirit of open 
debate, with no ideological parti-pris.  
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Introduction 
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a form of critical social analysis which focuses upon relations 
between discourse and other aspects of social life.  Its critique is in part ethical.  CDA is both 
normative critique and explanatory critique (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999:  33, 59-69; 
Fairclough 2015: 10-13), and ethical critique is a part of normative critique. Not all normative 
critique is ethical critique. Normative critique includes critique of truth claims, in addition to 
critique of ‘truthfulness’ and ‘rightness’ (Habermas 1984). Ethical critique is primarily critique of 
actions, but actions are conditioned and constrained by social practices, institutions and 
structures, so ethical critique needs to be extended to them. The analytical framework we 
outline below can incorporate this extension.  
The main concern of CDA is with political discourse, and its ethical critique is most often 
concerned with political values (justice, equality, liberty) as motives for action. CDA has a 
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connection with politics, and an orientation towards it. Political activists can draw upon the 
critique of existing social realities that it provides, in formulating and advocating political 
policies and strategies. Moreover, as a way of engaging in critical social science, CDA has an 
emancipatory knowledge interest (Habermas 1986), a concern with ‘wrongs’ in social life, which 
can and ought to be put right, including political ‘wrongs’ (injustice, unfairness, discrimination, 
domination). There is a sense in which CDA is advocative – it advocates (often implicitly) action, 
and change to put right certain ‘wrongs’ in social life – and partisan – it sides with people who 
suffer from such ‘wrongs’.  But CDA is a social science method, aiming to ‘speak truth to power’, 
and that requires not being politically partisan or ‘party political’ in the same way that political 
activism is.  Some work in CDA is politically partisan in this way, but our view is that it should 
not be. We want to argue in favour of a way of doing CDA that is not so much a form of 
advocacy of a particular pre-determined political standpoint, but a genuinely critical and open-
minded endeavour. 
 
In taking this position, we are opting for an approach to ethical critique in CDA which gives 
primacy to procedural ethics, to what Habermas (1996) calls ‘discourse ethics’, and to a 
particular form of it which arises from our recent ‘argumentative’ approach to CDA (Fairclough 
& Fairclough 2012). This involves a procedure for critical questioning of proposals for actions 
which can integrate considerations coming from deontological, virtue and consequentialist 
ethical perspectives.  A procedural approach provides an ethical commitment to impartiality in 
CDA, which is necessary to its status as critical social science method.  The procedure is applied 
in the normative critique of argumentation, in explanatory critique of aspects of social practices 
and structures, and in critique of advocated changes in practices and structures aimed at 
addressing such problems. Our approach treats CDA as ‘dialectical reasoning’, moving from 
normative critique, through explanation and explanatory critique, towards transformative 
action (Fairclough 2018).  
The term ‘discourse ethics’ is Habermas’s (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012: 30-34), but we are 
using it here in a general sense: for the view that an adequate framework for ethical evaluation 
and critique must include the comparison and evaluation of different arguments for different 
lines of action in a process of deliberation. Such assessments of arguments pose difficult 
problems, and deliberation is by no means guaranteed to produce consensus.  Nevertheless, 
deliberation can contribute to the quality of ethical critique by ensuring that a wide range of 
arguments are considered in making decisions, that all alternatives are taken into account and 
thoroughly criticized, and that people have to (at least) moderate their own partialities in 
evaluating a range of arguments collectively.  
To illustrate this, we shall refer to two ethically contentious political decisions and the courses 
of action which they led to.  The first is the decision by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair to 
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advocate Britain’s participation in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (we have discussed this in 
Fairclough & Fairclough 2012: 96-97). The second is the decision by the German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel to open Germany’s borders to the refugees coming from the Middle East in the 
autumn of 2015. In so doing, we will illustrate the relevance of ethical critique from all three of 
the major ethical positions: deontological, consequentialist and virtue ethics. 
 
CDA and practical argumentation 
CDA is mainly concerned with critical analysis of discourse which is oriented to action, including 
political discourse, but also managerial, organisational and other forms of discourse.  The 
primary activity in such discourse is practical argumentation, argumentation over action, over 
what is to be done (e.g. what policies should be adopted). Practical argumentation should 
accordingly be the primary analytical focus in CDA (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012). This does not 
exclude other familiar forms of analysis (such as analysing representations) but subsumes them. 
The point of representing (or ‘framing’) an issue in a particular way is to create particular public 
attitudes and opinions, and thus legitimize or facilitate a particular course of action.   
Critique of discourse is the focal concern for CDA, but critique of discourse is by no means 
exclusive to CDA. On the contrary, critique of discourse is a normal part of all discourse. It is a 
normal part of everyday practical argumentation: people find reasons in favour and against 
proposals for action, they consider alternatives, adopt them or discard them, and so on. A 
course of action worthy of being adopted is one that has withstood criticism. Agents may 
decide to discard proposals either because they are likely to be instrumentally inadequate in 
relation to the goals they are supposed to achieve, or because they find them ethically 
problematic, for example because the values or goals they are motivated by are unacceptable. 
Ethical critique is a concern for CDA at three levels:  as an aspect of agents’ reasoning, for 
example as an aspect of politicians’ deliberation over what policy to adopt; as an aspect of the 
normative critique of those deliberative practices which CDA carries out; as an aspect of the 
critique that CDA itself is open to. There are therefore three main places where ethical values 
come into the picture:  what values are arguers (e.g. politicians) arguing from? what are the 
values that CDA analysts are espousing, from the perspective of which they are evaluating the 
arguments of those arguers?  what are the values of other critics (including critics of CDA)?  
CDA is itself a form of discourse, which is specialized for academic critique of social actions, 
events, practices and structures, with a focus on discourse. It can itself be viewed as a form of 
practical argumentation (Fairclough 2013), open to the same critical questions that it directs at 
the discourse it subjects to critique. CDA practitioners are bound by an obligation to address 
ethical evaluations that are critical of their work.  Moreover, the ethical judgement which is 
part of the normative critique carried out in CDA does not come out of thin air, but is built upon 
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elements drawn selectively from ethical judgement and critique in public discourse. And CDA 
needs to rethink its own critique in response to shifts in public discourse and political reality, 
such as the emergence of controversy over ‘political correctness’ (Fairclough 2003).  
We have argued that the primary focus of critical analysis in CDA should be practical 
argumentation and deliberation (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012). This was based upon a claim 
about the character of political discourse, which we saw as primarily concerned with the 
question of what is to be done. Deliberation is an abstract genre in which (alternative) 
proposals are being tested. The framework for critical analysis of practical argumentation and 
deliberation which we have developed since 2012 provides CDA with an effective way of 
evaluating and critiquing discourse from an ethical point of view.  One of its strengths is that it 
allows different approaches to thinking about ethical questions (deontological, consequentialist 
and virtue ethics) to be combined within an ethical deliberative procedure for achieving 
impartiality.     
In a more recent version of this framework (Fairclough, I. 2016, 2018), deliberation is modelled 
as a critical procedure designed to filter out those practical conclusions (and corresponding 
decisions) that would not pass the test of critical questioning. Two distinct argument schemes 
are involved in deliberative activity types: an argument from goals, circumstances and means-
goal relations, and an argument from (negative or positive) consequences. Proposals are 
tentatively supported by practical arguments from goals, and are tested in the light of their 
potential consequences, via practical arguments from consequence. Goals are generated by 
various sources of normativity, and these can be what conventionally is called ‘values’, but can 
also be obligations, rights and duties.  Critical questioning seeks to expose potential negative 
consequences of proposals and thus evaluate them in terms of their acceptability or 
reasonableness: if the consequences are on balance unacceptable for those affected, then it 
would be more reasonable not to engage in the proposed course of action. Unacceptable 
consequences are critical objections which can conclusively rebut a proposal. Where two or 
more proposals survive critical testing, one may be chosen as the better proposal on non-
arbitrary grounds (e.g. being simpler to enact).   
In our view, the most significant perspective in the light of which proposals are to be tested is a 
consequentialist one (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012, Fairclough, I. 2016). The term 
‘consequence’ is however used here broadly to refer to several types of states-of-affairs:  the 
goals of the proposed action (the intended consequences); the potential unintended 
consequences (or risks) involved; various known and predictable impacts, including impacts on 
institutional, social facts. If a proposal is likely to result in a situation that is illegal or unjust, 
then the proposal can be evaluated as unacceptable from both a consequentialist ethics and a 
deontological ethical position. Our framework can therefore accommodate deontological 
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ethical issues within a broader consequentialist perspective. By inquiring into the motives of 
action, the framework can also accommodate a virtue-ethical perspective. 
 
Ethics and practical argumentation – an example 
As a branch of moral philosophy, ethics is concerned with the right things to do, what ought (or 
ought not) to be done. There are many frameworks for, or theories of ethics – Baggini & Fosl 
(2007) for instance list sixteen frameworks. Three major alternatives are widely recognized: 
deontological, consequentialist and virtue ethics.  According to deontological ethics, people 
have a duty to act in certain ways and not others in accordance with moral principles and 
commitments.  According to consequentialist ethics, people should select actions which have 
ethically positive consequences and reject actions which have negative consequences. 
According to virtue ethics, people should select actions which are virtuous and reject actions 
which are vicious, in accordance with virtues which they should cultivate.  
Deontological ethics relates to a particular type of source of normativity: rights, duties, 
obligations, prohibitions, etc.  These include what are traditionally thought of as values, such as 
political values like justice, equality and freedom (though not all ‘values’ are deontological 
constraints on action, e.g. valuing comfort or beauty). People are constrained to act in 
accordance with particular duties and obligations, as a consequence of the social, institutional 
arrangements they belong to, which provide them with ‘deontic’ reasons for action (Searle 
2010). British Prime Ministers, for instance, should act in accordance with their obligations 
towards the British people, created by the commitments they undertook in becoming Prime 
Ministers. These include respect for and observation of the law and parliamentary democracy, 
the wellbeing and protection of citizens, and so on. These obligations, as sources of normativity, 
restrict the goals that can be reasonably pursued and the courses of action that can be 
legitimately chosen.  The advantage of talking about ‘sources of normativity’ (as we first 
suggested in Fairclough & Fairclough 2012), instead of merely ‘values’, lies in enabling us to 
take ‘deontic’ reasons into account.  People have such deontic reasons for action (e.g. 
obligations) even when they choose not to act upon them, or are not actively concerned or 
motivated to act upon them. This is why their action can in fact be criticized: there is a 
normative expectation that they ought to act in particular ways, which sometimes people fail to 
fulfil. 
After the publication of the Chilcot Report on Britain’s role in the Iraq war of 2003, in July 2016, 
former Prime Minister Tony Blair defended his decision to take Britain into the war. He asked 
people to accept that he ‘believed that it was the right thing to do’ based on ‘the information’ 
that he had and ‘the threat’ that he perceived, and that his ‘duty … at that moment in time’ was 
to do what he ‘thought was right’ (The Independent 2016). At the Labour Party Conference in 
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September 2004, referring to the fact that no Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) had been 
found in Iraq despite assertions that they existed which were used to justify the invasion, Blair 
had said: ‘Do I know I'm right? Judgements aren't the same as facts. Instinct is not science. I'm 
like any other human being, as fallible and as capable of being wrong. I only know what I 
believe’ (BBC 2004).  
Blair was thus asking people to accept that he had made an ‘honest mistake’. He had acted 
sincerely, done what he thought was right, trying to prevent greater harm. In other words, his 
action satisfied the demands of deontological ethics (he had done his duty), virtue ethics (he had 
been sincere, he had not tried to deceive and manipulate public opinion) and consequentialist 
ethics (his decision had been taken in order to prevent an attack on Western countries). This 
triple line of self-defence was not generally accepted by the British public. Acting honestly and in 
good faith is of course necessary for a Prime Minister, but it is not sufficient. It was also Blair’s 
duty to make absolutely sure that the ‘information’ on alleged WMDs and the evidence that they 
posed a severe ‘threat’ was accurate.  Blair’s statement, ‘I only know what I believe’, suggests a 
bizarrely reduced view of his duties. When asked to clarify his claim, in his evidence to the Chilcot 
Inquiry in 2010, that it was ‘beyond doubt’ that Iraq was developing WMDs given intelligence 
reports, Blair said he ‘believed’ it was beyond doubt.   It was pointed out to him that it was not 
‘beyond anyone’s doubt’ in 2003 that Iraq had WMDs, and that strong doubt had been expressed 
at the time by MPs, weapons inspectors and the media, which he ought to have considered 
(Hoggart 2010).  There was, in other words, no support for the ‘honest mistake’ line of defence, 
either in 2003 or later. We have suggested Blair’s argument was a rationalization, a normatively 
defective argument where the reasons that are ostensibly offered in support of a claim are not 
the reasons that support the claim from the viewpoint of the arguer – i.e. the arguer believes the 
claim for other reasons. The main ethical problem with rationalizations has to do with sincerity, 
or honesty (a matter for virtue ethics): the arguer is being insincere, deceitful and possibly 
manipulative (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012: 95-99). The decision to go to war in Iraq has also 
proved disastrous in terms of the long-term consequences it has generated, which the Prime 
Minister ought to have properly thought through. 
 
Moral-political values: one concept, several conceptions 
Justice, equality and liberty are major political values.  While all three are generally 
acknowledged as political concepts across the political spectrum, there are different 
conceptions of each. In social critique, including CDA, values are however often appealed to as 
concepts, without much consideration of different conceptions. Failure to be precise about 
what conception of a value concept is being supported or opposed, and failure to make this a 
focus in deliberating over action, should be a concern for critique in CDA. For example, 
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politicians from all sides of the political spectrum speak of fairness, justice and freedom, but 
they do not seem to mean the same thing when they do so.  There is a danger, in CDA and 
elsewhere, of adopting a particular conception and talking about it as if it were the one and 
only one conception, for example defending equality on the assumption that a version of 
economic egalitarianism is the only legitimate way of talking about equality, hence if someone 
rejects economic egalitarianism then s/he is rejecting equality per se. 
Chapter 5 of Fairclough & Fairclough (2012) analyzes a 2009 public debate on the fairness of 
bankers’ bonuses and a comments thread in response to the Guardian article reporting on this 
debate. We distinguished there between prudential and moral arguments, the former based on 
interests and desires, the latter based on moral values. The prudential argument in favour of 
‘tolerating’ bankers’ bonuses took the familiar form of a ‘trickle down’ defence of inequality: 
given what is in people’s interests, or given that people want prosperity for all, inequality ought 
to be tolerated. In the comments thread, the public generally rejected the trickle-down 
argument as thinly disguised ‘blackmail’. Instead of this prudential view, Guardian readers put 
forward a variety of moral arguments against the inequality of bonuses. For example, since the 
state is committed to justice, and therefore obliged to act in a just manner, inequality should 
not be tolerated. In so doing, they drew on a broad concept of justice which they interpreted in 
various ways, as particular conceptions of justice.  
The distinction between a concept of justice (or freedom, or equality) and particular 
conceptions of it is usefully made in political philosophy (Swift 2006).  While the basic concept 
of justice (its basic grammar or logic) seems to be that it is about ‘giving people what is due to 
them’ (where this is obviously different from what people would desire to be given – punishing  
criminals is a way of giving them what is due to them, without being what they desire), there 
are various particular conceptions of justice, different ways of fleshing out the logic of the basic 
concept. The most influential conceptions are Rawls’ (1971) conception of justice-as-fairness, 
Nozick’s (1977) conception of justice-as-entitlement and the popular conception of justice-as-
desert. Most people seem to endorse elements of all three, often in ways that, upon closer 
inspection, are not coherent (Swift 2006: 11-13). According to the popular conception of justice 
as desert, giving people what is due to them means rewarding work, talent, success. Talented 
and hard-working individuals deserve to get more than untalented and idle ones. Moreover, 
they are entitled to higher rewards for their own talents and achievements. Justice-as-fairness, 
associated with John Rawls (1971), says that, under a ‘veil of ignorance’, people would choose 
principles that are fair and do not privilege anyone over anyone else. Same concept of justice, 
different conceptions. 
The comments thread illustrated all of these conceptions. Some people invoked justice-as-
desert: bankers do not deserve such rewards because they are not more hard-working and 
talented than the rest of the population; having crashed the world economy and failed at their 
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jobs, it is in fact clear that they deserve the exact opposite. Others invoked justice-as-fairness: 
the same treatment, the same rules should apply to all – it is not fair that banks should be 
rescued when they fail, and bankers too should pay the price for their recklessness, just like any 
other business people. Those who invoked justice-as-entitlement pointed out that  bankers are 
only entitled to their bonuses because the bonus culture is part of a system of rules they have 
themselves written. These rules, while legal, are morally wrong and need changing. From these 
various ways of evaluating the situation from a moral point of view, various lines of action were 
advocated, in order to redress the perceived injustice of bonuses. 
In this comments thread, readers also argued from the government’s commitment to justice, 
from an implicit ‘social contract’, whose objective binding nature ought to be recognized and 
internalized as motivation by the government in decision making. Even when politicians fail to 
act from a commitment to justice, this argument goes, they ought to do so. They have a reason 
to do so, one that they have themselves created by accepting a mandate of political 
representation. Recognizing the specificity of the social world as a world of man-made 
institutions (commitments, contracts, laws, norms), generating external, deontic reasons (e.g. 
rights and obligations) that agents are bound by even when they choose to act otherwise, 
underlies in fact the very possibility of normative critique. What agents say and do can only be 
criticized by reference to what they ought to have said and done. The specificity of moral 
reasoning (including moral-political argumentation) derives from the recognition of such 
external, desire-independent reasons for action as fundamental to reasonable argumentation 
and decision-making. In deliberating over what to do, and in critically questioning proposals and 
decisions, agents are expected to give due weight to the overriding force of such reasons. 
 
Consequences or moral principles and virtues?  
Let us turn to German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s decision in the autumn of 2015 to open the 
borders of Germany to refugees coming from the war-torn countries of the Middle East.  Her 
reasons for doing so are a matter of controversy. A wide variety of reasons have been 
suggested, including: using the refugee crisis as an opportunity to admit a labour force which 
would benefit the German economy; wanting to improve Germany’s international reputation 
by seeming to respond in a humane way to the crisis; wanting to out-manoeuvre the German 
left; being blackmailed into admitting refugees by foreign powers, the Americans or the 
Russians (Deliso 2017). There is also a theory that Merkel was emotionally shaken by being 
violently abused when she visited a refugee centre, and wanted to demonstrate her liberal 
credentials. Merkel’s words, on August 31, 2015 –  ‘Wir können das schaffen, und wir schaffen 
das’ (‘We can do it, and we’re going to’) – may seem banal, but they had a strong resonance, 
evoking the ability of Germans to cope with difficult problems and their strong commitment to 
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doing the right thing. On September 15, she said: ‘If we now start having to apologize for 
showing a friendly face in emergency situations, then this is no longer my country’ (Nelles 
2015). As a consequence, in 2015 Germany recorded its largest influx of migrants (over one 
million net, and nearly 2 million in total), though only a proportion of these were from Syria 
(Sanders 2016). 
Angela Merkel’s decision continues to be highly controversial in Germany. She was widely 
criticized, not least by the leader of the Bavarian CSU, the sister party to the CDU (Merkel’s 
party).  Politicians and members of the public alike criticized her particularly for having made a 
decision on (what appeared to be) humanitarian grounds without properly considering the 
(immediate and long-term) consequences of such a large influx of immigrants.  Merkel’s 
decision, whatever its motives, and its critical evaluation are an excellent illustration of the 
three ethical frameworks at work, and the way in which they all make overriding demands on 
decision-makers. Which kind of ethics should be given primacy? Should she neglect 
humanitarian and categorical moral imperatives, i.e. the demands of virtue (charity and 
compassion) and deontological ethics (moral duty and obligations under international law), and 
keep borders closed in order to avoid negative impacts on the German and other European 
nations? Or should she, on the contrary, act from a sense of overriding duty, or overriding 
charity, and ignore the risks and impacts?  
A January 2016 article entitled ‘The Isolated Chancellor. What Is Driving Angela Merkel?’ in Der 
Spiegel (Feldenkircher and Pfister 2016) puts her dilemma into sharp perspective. Speculating 
on the motives of her decision, the authors begin with an anecdote. At a charitable concert for 
the refugee cause, Angela Merkel was told by a friend, a man of the church, that her 
‘courageous and wonderful’ refugee policies reminded him of the words of former Czech 
president and dissident Vaclav Havel: ‘Hope is not the conviction that something will turn out 
well, but the certainty that something makes sense, regardless of how it turns out’. These 
words had apparently made a strong impression on the Chancellor.  The article continues in this 
way:  
It is completely unclear how the experiment will end that the German chancellor has 
forced upon the European Continent, upon her fellow citizens and, not least, upon her 
party. Her decision late last summer to open the German border to refugees transformed 
Merkel into a historic figure. It was the most consequential decision of her entire decade 
in office. The US newsmagazine Time named her Person of the Year, and in the fall she 
was widely considered to be in the running for the Nobel Peace Prize. 
 
Since then, the mood has shifted, and not just in Germany. To prevent ‘a rebirth of 1930s-
style political violence’, New York Times columnist Ross Douthat recently wrote, ‘Angela 
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Merkel must go’ (…). As much as the decision to open the borders itself, what amazes 
many observers is the stubbornness with which Merkel has maintained her political 
course. Neither the terror attacks in Paris nor the sexual assaults on New Year's Eve in 
Cologne – neither the indignation of furious German citizens nor the warnings from 
within her own party –  have led Merkel to question her decision to keep Germany's 
borders open. It seems as though Angela Merkel –  à la Vaclav Havel – is convinced that 
her course of action makes sense. No matter how the situation turns out. 
 
… Half the world is wondering what is motivating the German chancellor. What's the 
answer? What's driving Angela Merkel, a woman who gained power by virtue of her 
implacable pragmatism and who is now governing so unconditionally? Why has she thus 
far shown no serious indication that she might shift course on refugee policy despite the 
fact that her popularity ratings are plummeting and the foundations of her power are 
crumbling? 
 
Merkel's chief of staff, Peter Altmaier … is the voice of Merkel's refugee policy…  From 
Merkel's perspective, Altmaier explains, this is what the world looks like: in order to avoid 
a humanitarian catastrophe late last summer, she had little choice but to open the 
borders. Now, the task is that of preventing Europe from falling apart. Were Germany to 
now close its borders, it wouldn't just mark a failure for Europe's border-free travel 
regime known as Schengen. The refugee flow would also backup across the Balkans and 
would destabilize the fragile young democracies there… Greece would become overrun 
with desperate refugees from Syria and Iraq while Jordan and Lebanon, which are already 
hosting almost 2 million refugees, could be pushed to the brink of collapse…. That, at 
least, is the official version. When speaking with Merkel's people, her refugee policies 
come across as being entirely rational. Like a chain of political necessities. (…) 
 
On July 15, Merkel met a 13-year-old girl named Reem Sahwil at a town meeting in the 
northern German city of Rostock. The girl had fled to Germany from Lebanon four years 
before but she was now in danger of being deported. ‘It is really painful to see others 
really enjoying life when you can't enjoy life yourself,’ the girl said. It was the old Merkel 
who answered. She didn't want to seem heartless, but she also didn't want to make any 
promises just because she had stumbled into an awkward situation. ‘(If we would say) you 
can all come from Africa, and you can all come –  we couldn't handle that,’ Merkel 
stammered. Couldn't handle it. Not long after Merkel finished, Reem began crying and 
Merkel awkwardly tried to comfort her. In the days that followed, Merkel was accused of 




In the days that followed, something changed in the Chancellery. When Merkel gave her 
annual summer press conference on August 31, she no longer said that Germany is 
unable to take everybody. Neither did she speak of the risk of being overwhelmed, like 
she had in Rostock. ‘Germany is a strong country,’ Merkel said. ‘The motivation with 
which we should approach these things has to be: We have handled so much. We can 
handle it!’ (…) On Sept. 4, she opened up the border to the refugees trapped in Hungary. 
Later, she said that she had watched on television as people from Syria had gathered in 
the Keleti train station in Budapest and were then prevented from continuing their 
journey. She found it outrageous. Merkel decided to allow the refugees to come to 
Germany. Three days later, she said she was ‘a bit proud of our country.’ 
From then on, the numbers of refugees coming to Germany began to climb rapidly. Soon, 
it was 10,000 per day –  and as the influx grew, so too did the number of Merkel's critics. 
Bavarian Governor Seehofer said that Merkel had made a mistake that would affect 
Germany for a long time to come…(…)  The Germans may wish for a time prior to the 
refugee crisis, but that is a wish she cannot fulfill, Merkel said. Of course, she could close 
the borders, but then masses of people would accumulate in front of the barbed wire. 
The images would be ugly. Germans, she said, can't even stand it when someone is forced 
to spend the night outside. 
 
She, though, wanted to combat the causes of the refugee crisis at the roots and 
cooperate with Turkey, Merkel said. As long as she was leading, Germany would not 
become a country that intentionally chased away people in need. ‘I will not become 
involved in a competition for who can treat the refugees the worst,’ she said. (…) Merkel, 
of course, also saw the refugee crisis in the light of realpolitik. She has long pursued the 
goal of stealing centrist voters away from the center-left Social Democrats (SPD). (…) Yet if 
it had only been about tactics, Merkel would have abandoned her approach long ago, at 
the latest when the right-wing populist party Alternative for Germany (AfD) began rising 
in the polls and her own popularity figures began dropping. There must be a different, 
more personal motivation, for her unwillingness to change course… 
 
[A close friend] believes that her Christian roots are very apparent in her approach to the 
refugee crisis. ‘She is the daughter of a socialist pastor. And her mother was an extremely 
devout woman. Such things are deep within you, they don't just disappear,’ he says. [Her 
family] adhered to a practical form of theology that involved helping the poor, sick and 
disadvantaged…. Merkel grew up with the tenet that, if a stranger is standing in the rain 
before your door, you let him in and help…  
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In these journalists’ view, Merkel may have acted from a sense of Christian duty (or from some 
categorical moral imperative), overriding whatever other reasons she may have had. She may 
also have been driven by (the virtues of) charity and compassion, and possibly also by (personal 
and political) self-interest. But, at least from this account, it seems that potential consequences 
of her decision did not seem to carry much weight: her course of action seemed right to her, 
and ‘made sense’, regardless of the consequences, regardless of how things would ‘turn out’. 
According to the above account, taking the consequences into account seemed at best an 
afterthought: Angela Merkel seemed more concerned with the consequences of reversing her 
original decision. 
The discussion of Merkel’s ‘motives’, of the ‘normative sources’ that led her to a particular 
conclusion and decision, continues in the comments thread attached to this article in Der 
Spiegel (47 comments, amounting to around 4600 words). There is no space for a detailed 
account here, but we will quote one of these comments, for illustration (from eugenefine, on 
01/26/2016, entitled ‘Merkel - Driving migration’): 
A very compelling article. But utterly disingenuous. Much sentimental verbiage. No 
mention of Merkel’s ruthless humiliation of Greece, ongoing. Passing reference to her 
autocratic dismissal of the concerns of her EU partners. There is nothing very [compelling] 
about these. On the contrary, there is a chilling dimension to the notion of the certainty 
that ‘something makes sense, regardless of how it turns out’. Is that not a succinct 
encapsulation of the mindset of Fascism? Is this not the same ‘logic’ that informed the 
Final Solution? Germany should be very mindful of the dangers of absolutes and of 
imposing them on others. As I read the words of Rainer Eppelman, quoting Vaclav Havel, 
and how Merkel was so impressed with them, a cold chill passed over my body…  The 
crisis is in real danger of giving rise to the unthinkable. Dressed up in the language of 
humanitarianism, is has all the ingredients of a determinism to something quite different. 
You are correct to identify Merkel’s policy as an ‘experiment’, but how dangerous to 
undertake such a venture without more care and sensitivity, especially to the experience 
of our histories. What ‘makes sense’? To make unilateral decisions with enormous 
consequences for the EU without consulting EU Members? To commit to a ‘welcome’ to 
an (as yet) unlimited number of potentially limitless numbers of migrants? To persist with 
this policy in defiance of public support? To create dissension between EU Members in a 
hideous game of shaming and isolation and threats to those of a different viewpoint? To 
allow traffickers and NGOs (of variable credibility) to continue to hardwire the 
exploitation of the migrant trail? To entertain sham engagements with Turkey and 
Greece? To use the obscenity of the migrant trail as a baton by which to enforce 
Shengen? To tar every attempt by ordinary decent people to engage in Spiegel’s earlier 
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reasonable appeal for ‘measured debate’ as being ‘right wing, fascist, racist and 
xenophobic’? … No doubt Angela Merkel meant well. But she is Chancellor of Germany. 
Naivety is a kind word in this instance…. 
 
For eugenefine, there is a ‘chilling dimension’ to the ‘certainty that something makes sense, 
regardless of how it turns out’ – this, s/he says, is the mindset of Fascism, ‘dressed up in the 
language of humanitarianism’. Acting from a sense of absolute, overriding duty, without regard 
for consequences, can be dangerous (this being in fact a standard objection to a Kantian 
deontological approach). Angela Merkel, this reader argues, should have never made ‘unilateral 
decisions with enormous consequences for the EU without consulting EU Members’, nor should 
she encourage the ‘tarring’ of those ordinary people who disagree with her as ‘fascist, racist 
and xenophobic’. At best naïve, the reader suggests, Angela Markel seems to have 
misunderstood her obligations as Chancellor toward her own people.  
This kind of critique, along the lines that Angela Merkel has misunderstood the demands of 
duty, charity and justice, saying, for example, that in being charitable and compassionate 
(virtues), she has failed in her obligations as a politician, and been unjust to the German people, 
has been heard many times, in various forms since 2015 (Murray 2017: 294-296). Clearly, the 
deontic powers which attach to her institutional position as Chancellor include the obligation to 
make decisions on the basis of a proper assessment of the negative consequences that are 
likely to follow, and by consultation with others (we made the same argument in relation to 
Blair’s decision), and in the light of a public democratic mandate (as an elected politician)  
Whether she or anyone else involved had anticipated those consequences on Germany and 
Europe, the criticism goes, they had not entered into her decision and action, nor had a process 
of democratic deliberation and consultation taken place, which are serious ethical and political 
failures. 
We have discussed the ethics of Blair’s and Merkel’s decisions and actions, but what about the 
ethics of CDA?  What should the CDA analyst do when analyzing such debates? If CDA gives 
primacy to ‘discourse ethics’ in its ethical critique, as we think it should, it is committed to 
applying that critique to a reasonably representative range of the proposals which figure in the 
debate, in an even-handed way which aims for impartiality, and to evaluating proposals 
according to whether they stand up to critical testing.  Analysts will generally have their own 
views about the rights and wrongs of such decisions and actions, but they should not allow 
their own political agendas to shape their critical analysis. They should not short-circuit the 
deliberative procedure for ethical evaluation and critique by rejecting standpoints different 
from their own out of hand, for instance by labelling them ‘racist’ or ‘xenophobic’, or in other 
ways unreasonable, without considering those standpoints impartially, on their merits, based 
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on factual evidence. Many CDA analysts are also political activists, and in many cases it is their 
political convictions that have attracted them to CDA. This can lead to tensions between the 
demands of politics and the demands of critique, but the value and credibility of CDA depends 
upon analysts keeping them apart.  
 
CDA as argumentation and critique 
CDA is a form of explanatory critique as well as normative critique. Explanatory critique explains 
problems (identified through normative critique) as effects of existing states of affairs, including 
social structures and practices. Aspects of existing states of affairs which lead to such problems 
are themselves taken to be part of the ‘problem’, and consequently need to be changed in 
order to resolve the ‘problem’.  This allows our framework to extend critique, including ethical 
critique, from actions and events to practices, institutions and structures. Explanatory critique 
incorporates a move from facts to values: x causes problem y (fact), so x is a ‘wrong’ that needs 
righting (value). In committing itself to explanatory critique, CDA moves from the question of 
what is problematic or flawed in existing states of affairs towards the question of what should 
be done, and from a concern with ethical problems towards a concern with ethical solutions.  
This is the move that is made in practical argumentation: from problematic existing 
circumstances to goals and actions to change them, all in the light of values (as normative 
sources). CDA itself can be thus seen as a form of practical argumentation. We have suggested 
that it is a form of practical argumentation which we have called ‘dialectical reasoning’ 
(Fairclough 2018), with the following four steps: 
1. Normative critique of discourse. 
2. Explanation of normatively criticised discourse in terms of features of the existing state 
of affairs (existing social reality). 
3. Explanatory critique of the existing state of affairs. 
4. Advocating action to change the existing state of affairs ‘for the better’.  
Practical argumentation often has a problem-solution structure, moving from the identification 
of problems in existing circumstances – the ‘problematization’ of existing circumstances – to 
proposing solutions to these problems, in the light of external deontic constraints. For example, 
in proposing a solution (doing A) in order to resolve a problematic situation, agents will have to 
make sure that A does not clash with their obligations to respect institutional arrangements 
already in place (i.e. whatever proposal is adopted, it will have to be legal, moral, etc.). 
It has long been recognized that, while CDA has generally focused upon ‘negative’ critique of 
existing states of affairs, its critique also has a ‘positive’ element, even if this is left implicit in 
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most analyses.  For instance, in problematizing what Tony Blair said and did in the run-up to the 
Iraq war, one is inevitably suggesting what he should do (if the critique is contemporary with 
the events) or should have done. Taking CDA to be this particular form of practical 
argumentation, dialectical reasoning, is a way of making this move from problems to solutions 
explicit.  
There are good grounds for the view that solutions are an inherent part of CDA: critique and 
problematization of existing circumstances and states of affairs are inconceivable without 
positing possible alternatives to what actually exists. We can see this as the application of 
‘sociological imagination’ (Mills 1959):  social critique situates its local and particular objects of 
critique in the wider social context of social practices and structures, which not only enables 
explanation of problems, but also enables identification of hitherto unrealized possibilities, 
what is potential in existing states of affairs as well as what is actual, what could be as well as 
what is.  This has an ethical aspect: possible alternatives must not only provide feasible, 
achievable solutions to problems, they must be more than instrumentally adequate. The 
imagined solutions must meet ethical criteria, they must be generated by goals and values, by 
normative sources that can be argumentatively defended as the ‘right’ goals and values to 
have. ‘Imagination’ plays an essential role in practical reasoning. Solutions are imagined, on the 
basis of an analysis which identifies the unrealized potential in existing states of affairs, then 
tested in the light of their consequences: would they achieve the stated goals? would they have 
unacceptable side effects?, and so on.  You cannot problematize what is actual without at the 
same time imagining possible solutions.  
This gives rise to problems of differentiation and demarcation which bear upon the ethical 
character of CDA itself, and the ethical critique which it is open to.  Politics, in the sense of 
political activism, is also in the business of finding solutions to problems. Is CDA politics, or is 
there a difference between the two?  CDA often appears to be political advocacy, advocating 
certain political positions, strategies or policies, and actions, and directing its social (including 
ethical) critique of discourse at other political positions, strategies, policies and actions which 
are incompatible with those advocated; politically partisan, as we put it in the introduction, 
‘party political’.  Should we accept this, or should we insist on a clear demarcation between 
CDA and politics?  
As we noted in the introduction, there is a limited sense in which CDA is a form of advocacy and 
partisanship. CDA is committed to ‘righting’ perceived social ‘wrongs’, and sides with people 
who suffer from such ‘wrongs’.  There is a tension between advocacy and partisanship in CDA, 
on the one hand, even in these limited forms, and its commitment to social scientific critique, 
on the other.  CDA sometimes tends to slide into political activism, and continuing debate over 
where the line should be drawn is inevitable. But there should be a clear difference between 
politics and CDA in what is focal: action to bring about social change in politics; critical analysis 
16 
 
and understanding of problems, as a basis for imagining feasible and ethical solutions, in CDA. 
The focus in CDA needs to be on critique, on criticism, which includes a willingness to subject its 
own standpoints to critical questioning, rather than defending a pre-determined normative 
standpoint, even in the face of evidence that it may be unreasonable.  (An observation which 
W.B. Yeats makes about poetry helps to make the point: ‘will must not usurp the work of 
imagination’.  Poetry is also sometimes concerned with the righting of ‘wrongs’, but the ‘will’ to 
do so must not ‘usurp’ its focal concern with ‘the work of imagination’. And will must not usurp 
critique in CDA.) 
In our view, CDA can best protect its focal concern with social scientific critique by giving 
primacy to a methodological procedure. With respect to its ethical critique, in particular, CDA 
should privilege a procedural ‘discourse ethics’, grounded in a requirement of impartiality, of 
evaluating diverse and conflicting proposals for action, and incorporating a multiplicity of 
possible ethical standpoints -  deontological, consequentialist and virtue ethics.  CDA itself can 
be seen as practical, deliberative reasoning: the analyst evaluates practical argumentation (e.g. 
in political discourse), and proposes possible solutions to problems, in the light of goals (as 
desirable ‘imaginaries’) and in accordance with normative sources such as moral-political 
values. These goals and normative sources are selected in accordance with the limited advocacy 
and partisanship of CDA as a form of critical social analysis.  
 
A commitment to discourse ethics is the most important part of the ethics of doing CDA.  What 
should distinguish CDA from political activism is a commitment to impartiality and to 
methodological attitude, manifested in the primacy given to the notion of criticism, e.g. the use 
of a systematic framework for analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse.  CDA has 
often selected for critique only discourse which it strongly disagrees with. A useful rule of 
thumb would be to also critically question argumentation which has a similar perspective to its 
own, or indeed its own argumentation, not in order to provide a ‘balanced view’, but in order to 
make its own claims open to critical questioning, identify and respond to possible counter-
arguments, and ensure that it is not biased.   This is particularly important in the light of 
prevailing tendencies for political cultures and practices to shift towards self-confirming 
positions, with political groups inhabiting ‘bubbles’ and rejecting engagement with opponents. 
One way of doing this is by applying labels (e.g. ‘sexist’, ‘racist’ or ‘politically correct’), which not 
only prevent much needed debates from taking place in society, but also discredit and even 
criminalize argumentative opponents.  This is of course a permanent feature of politics, but 
there seems to be an alarming increase in scale and effect. CDA has a methodological 
commitment to an open and impartial process of critical questioning, in which arguments for 
different lines of action are evaluated and criticized. This is not designed as a model for politics, 
but it can nevertheless set a standard which politics, in its parlous contemporary state, might 
benefit from.  
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Argument evaluation that contributes to ethical critique can involve questioning of the value 
and goal premises (are the stated values and goals acceptable?), criticizing the proposed action 
itself in the light of its potential consequences (if these are on balance unacceptable, then the 
proposal cannot be defended), and criticizing the truth of the premises (e.g. is true that the 
agent is motivated by the goals and values he claims to be motivated by? Is the description of 
the situation, or ‘problem’ to be resolved, accurate?). In deliberating over action, agents are 
often faced with competing goals, competing obligations, arising from various sources of 
normativity. For example, they might be expected to sacrifice their desires in order to fulfil an 
obligation.  Or they might be expected to give up some perceived benefits in order to avoid 
some unacceptable costs.  
This critique needs to be extended in two connected directions: adding a critique of existing 
institutional deontologies, and adding a wider (ethical) critique of existing social practices and 
structures.  These are secured through our view of deliberation in CDA as a form of dialectical 
reasoning, and specifically though the move from normative critique of discourse to 
explanation, and to explanatory critique of existing states of affairs, practices and structures, 
and to the advocacy of action to change existing states of affairs ‘for the better’ which this leads 
to.  Decisions made in accordance with all the relevant institutional rules, for example, may not 
be legitimate, i.e. may not withstand a process of public justification, if the institutional 
framework is unfair. The institutional set-up may be such as to bias decisions in accordance 
with the interests of certain parties or agents. For example, decisions against shale gas 
applications taken at local county council level can be legally reversed by government ministers 
on appeal (Fairclough forthcoming). In such cases, where all decision-makers have fulfilled their 
institutional obligations, according to the rules in place, the problem lies with the institutional 
design, not with the failure of agents to comply with its constraints. Normative critique needs 
to be supplemented by explanatory critique, by asking why the institutional arrangements are 
they way they are, and whose interests they serve, and how existing states of affairs need to be 
changed, for instance in ways which strengthen local democracy by devolving more powers to 
local authorities.  
  
Identity politics and political correctness 
There are two more issues with ethical implications, which are closely connected, that we 
would like to address: identity politics and ‘political correctness’ – both have been relevant to 
the concerns of CDA. Identity politics emerged out of new social movements in the 1960s and 
1970s which focused upon inequalities and injustices affecting for instance women (e.g. there 
were very few women in parliament or in senior management, and those there were had to 
overcome obstacles which men generally did not), gay people (e.g. homosexuality was only 
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decriminalized in Britain in 1967), black people (e.g. the Race Relations Act prohibiting racial 
discrimination in employment, housing etc was passed only in 1968). On the political left, an 
exclusive focus upon class inequalities and injustices was substantially shifted to include 
inequalities/injustices on grounds of gender, sexuality, and race.  Existing institutional 
deontologies were criticized for excluding such inequalities and injustices, and substantively 
changed.  But these developments have arguably led to a tendency to focus political struggles 
for justice and freedom too much on particular identity groups, and to a form of politics which 
came to be criticised as ‘politically correct’ (PC).   
Here is a part of a left-wing critique of ‘PC’ by Stuart Hall (1994):  
Taken together, these things go some way to explaining the particular style of PC: its 
confrontational, in-your-face mode of address. It consciously intrudes a stance and tone 
of voice which seem more appropriate to public contestation into so-called ‘private 
space’. Many have commented on the intellectualist or ‘academic’ nature of PC politics. 
I think they not only mean that PC seems to be often contained within academia. They 
are also referring to what some philosophers call its extreme ‘nominalism’, that is to 
say, its apparent belief that if things are called by a different name they will cease to 
exist.  It has a highly individualistic notion of politics -  politics as the lone embattled 
individual ‘witnessing to the Truth’. PC gives the impression of a small but dedicated 
band who are determined to stand up and be counted. That isn’t the only sense in 
which PCers remind one of latter-day Puritans like the Saints of the seventeenth 
century. A strong strain of moral self-righteousness has often been PC’s most 
characteristic ‘voice’.   
PC is of relevance to the concerns of this paper because of its ‘moral self-righteousness’, and 
the attraction of identity politics for many practitioners of CDA with, in some cases, a leaning 
towards PC.  Given our emphasis on procedural and deliberative ethics in CDA’s ethical critique, 
we are strongly opposed to any PC tendencies in CDA. Defenders of multicultural identity 
politics should perhaps reflect on how the focus on the rights of groups has tended to be at the 
expense of the rights and responsibilities of all citizens. In emphasizing ‘community’, seen as a 
cultural and religious entity, multicultural policies have downplayed the requirement for all 
identity groups, all religious communities, to adhere to a shared set of fundamental political 
values. They have led to segregation along ethnic or religious lines, and failed to produce a 
political community of citizens.  
But there is also another relevant characteristic of the politics of PC: as we have said, labelling 
opponents as ‘racist’ or ‘xenophobic’ can have the effect of closing down political debate and 
discrediting or even criminalizing one’s argumentative opponents. This is not only morally 
objectionable, but will also eventually backfire, producing undesirable consequences.  Arguably, 
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one of the causes of the Brexit vote in June 2016 had to do with the way a legitimate debate 
over migration into the UK, which many people felt was overdue, had been persistently stifled 
by certain (typically left-wing) political and intellectual elites branding everyone who objected 
to increasing migration as ‘racist’ and ‘xenophobic’.  Many legitimate arguments, driven by 
values and concerns that had nothing to do with racism, had been suppressed for too long, and 
arguably found expression in the Brexit vote.  
One effect of the fragmentation of broad political constituencies, notably the ‘labour 
movement’ as a working class movement combining trade unions and left political parties, is a 
tendency in politics towards self-confirming political ‘bubbles’, on the right and on the left, in 
which members of a ‘bubble’ think about and talk to each other, but rarely outsiders.  There is a 
difference between left and right in that, while the former tends to moral (self-)righteousness, 
the latter tends to mockery: ‘PC’ is a mocking, ironic or sarcastic term which evokes aspects of 
the PC style identified by Hall.  Both can be seen as forms of ethical critique; but the emphasis 
for the left is on deontological ethics, on what is morally ‘wrong’, whereas the emphasis for the 
right is on virtue ethics, on the vices and flaws of certain categories of people. Mockery is 
common – a recent example involves referring to students seeking ‘safe’ spaces where their 
feelings will not be ‘hurt’ as ‘snowflakes’ – but not essential. Labelling welfare claimants as 
‘spongers’ has a self-righteous moralistic tone. However, CDA practitioners should not only 
critically evaluate terms such as ‘snowflakes’ and ‘spongers’, but should also interrogate the 
reasonableness of the idea of ‘safe spaces’ in universities, and the justification of the UK’s so-
called ‘benefits culture’. 
Summing up, we think CDA should give more attention than it has done to the politics of PC and 
the debate around PC.  We argued above that CDA’s own ethical critique is built out of ethical 
critique in public discourse, and that it needs to rethink its own critique in response to shifts in 
public discourse and crucially in response to facts and evidence.  PC is the clearest recent 
example. This does not mean uncritically adopting the critique of PC, though it does mean 
recognising (with Hall 1994) that there is some substance in it. Critical evaluation includes 
assessing whether or not there is factual justification for such labels as ‘racist’ or ‘sponger’; for 
instance, as Browne (2006) puts it, whether calling people ‘racist’ is ‘factually correct’ as well as 
purportedly politically correct, or whether calling people ‘spongers’ is factually incorrect as well 
as purportedly politically incorrect.   
 
Conclusion 
We have argued for a procedural approach to ethical critique in CDA based upon the 
‘argumentative turn’ in CDA advocated in our recent publications.  This is not a matter of 
abandoning substantive critique, or abandoning the long-standing commitment of our version 
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of CDA to critique of domination and of ideology, but of integrating them into a deliberative 
procedure for critical questioning, from an impartial and unbiased standpoint.  The advantage 
of this position is that it enables us to accentuate ethical criticism and critique in CDA rather 
than advocacy and partisanship. The latter do have a place in CDA in the limited form which we 
have indicated, though not in the ‘party political’ form of political activism, but the centre of 
gravity in CDA should be subjecting argumentation, including its own argumentation, to 
systematic critical questioning in the spirit of open debate, with no ideological parti-pris.  
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